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ROLE OF COURTS IN CHURCH PROPERTY
to prevent death or serious physical injury. A physician may use force
to administer treatment he reasonably believes to be in the subject's best
interests if the patient consents or one legally competent to consent on
his behalf does so. In emergency cases the physician must reasonably be-
lieve that no one competent to consent is available, and that such person
would consent if available. Finally, the use of force is permitted if neces-
sary to prevent another person from committing suicide or seriously in-
juring himself. This provision has no counterpart in current law.69
JAlzms R. BICKEL
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Questions concerning the scope of the religion clauses of the first
amendment1 arise most frequently in the context of legislative infringement.
Yet, the courts also have violated the free exercise and establishment clauses
by resolving doctrinal questions in controversies over the use of church
property. The Supreme Court first recognized such infringement in Presby-
terian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church,2 wherein the Court restricted the civil judiciary's
role in church property disputes by holding that they must be resolved
without determining ecclesiastical questions.
Religious societies, though perhaps more insulated from change than
other organizations, are certainly not immune from it. A shift in theological
doctrine can provoke schisms within a church body. Sometimes doctrinal
disputes arise because of internal disagreement over socio-political values.3
Whatever the cause, the schism often results in vigorous battles for the
control of church property, be it country meeting house or cathedral.
This comment deals with the role of the courts in resolving church
property disputes. It will examine the approach of the Missouri courts to
these controversies4 and the effect of the Presbyterian Church Case on that
approach. It will then explore recent cases interpreting the Presbyterian
Church Case.
69. PROP. NEw Mo. CRim. CODE § 8.110, Comment (1973).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. . ." The
first amendment free exercise and establishment clauses are applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1946); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2. 393 U.S. 440 (1969) [hereinafter the Presbyterian Church Case].
3. See generally ZOLLMTANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAw 250-51 (1933).
4. For other discussions of church property disputes in Missouri see Losos,
Courts and the Churches in Missouri: A Survey of Missouri Law on Intra-Church
Disputes With Reference to the Political Theory of the Pluralists, 1956 WASH.
U.L.Q. 67; 3 St. L.U.L.J. 310 (1955).
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II. CHURCH POLrTy
A basic understanding of church polity is necessary in evaluating the
complex issues that arise in church property litigation. Polity is the church's
governmental structure and organs of authority as determined by its or-
ganic law.5 There are two basic types of polity, congregational and hier-
archical.6 The principle of local autonomy controls in a congregational
church; the local church is governed by majority vote of the members of
the congregation. In contrast to this is hierarchical polity, a system whereby
each local church is subject to the control of a higher ecclesiastical au-
thority. There are two subcategories of hierarchical polity, episcopal polity
and synodical or connectional polity. With episcopal polity power resides
in clerical officers such as bishops or patriarchs. Power in the synodical
or connectional polity is vested in lay persons and ministers through an as-
cending hierarchy of representational bodies. The government of the Pres-
byterian church exemplifies the latter with its session, presbytery, synod,
and general assembly, the supreme judicatory.7
The courts have correctly recognized that a congregational church may
be affiliated with other churches and still maintain its congregational
polity.8 Church polity is not always easy to classify, however, because an
organization may contain elements of both hierarchical and congregational
polities.9 For example, a Missouri court determined the Lutheran Church
to be congregational, 10 but a California court held it to be hierarchical. 11
III. THE LMPLIED TRUST AND DEPARTURE-FRoM-DOCTRINE STANDARD
A. Historical Background
The implied trust rule with its correlative departure-from-doctrine
standard has been applied to both congregational and hierarchical churches.
The theory of implied trust means, for a congregational church, that a
donation for religious purposes is impressed with a trust in favor of the
doctrine in effect at the time the contribution is made. Thus, in the event
of a schism within the church the property goes to those faithful to the
original doctrine.'2 The theory regarding a hierarchical church is that
there is an implied trust of local church property in favor of the general
church as long as the general church adheres to doctrine in effect when the
5. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian
Church Case, 1969 Sup. Ct. REv. 347, 353-54.
6. Id. at 354. One of the first Missouri cases to recognize this distinction
was McRoberts v. Moudy, 19 Mo. App. 26 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
7. Presbyterian Church Case, 393 U.S. 440, 442 (1969); See Kauper, supra
note 5; Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property,
75 HARv. L. REv. 1142, 1143-44 (1962).
8. See Mills v. Yount, 393 S.W.2d 96 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965); Montgomery v.
Snyder, 320 S.W.2d 283 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
9. See Kauper, supra note 5, at 370-72; pt. V, § B of this comment.
10. Mertz v. Schaeffer, 271 S.W.2d 238 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
11. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Dysinger, 120 Cal. App.
139, 6 P.2d 552 (1932).
12. McRoberts v. Moudy, 19 Mo. App. 26, 32-34 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
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local church first affiliated. This rule originated in England' s and was
formerly widely accepted by American courts, most frequently in disputes
involving congregational churches. 14
In the 1872 decision of Watson v. Jones,15 the Supreme Court rejected
the departure-from-doctrine element of the implied trust theory.16 Jones
involved a schism in the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville,
Kentucky, engendered by an antislavery declaration of the highest tri-
bunal of the Presbyterian Church. This tribunal, the general assembly, de-
termined that the local group loyal to its antislavery declaration represented
the true members of the Louisville church. Subsequently, a state court de-
cided against the loyal group in a suit over title to the church property.
1 7
The loyalists then sought injunctive relief in federal court based on diversity
of citizenship.
The Jones Court listed three classes of church property controversies
that come before the courts: (1) Those in which property is held subject
to an express trust in favor of a specific religious doctrine or belief; (2)
those in which property that is not subject to an express trust is held by a
congregation that is entirely independent and owes no obligation to a
higher authority; and (3) those cases where property that is free of any ex-
press trust is held by a local congregation which is subject to the control of
a higher authority.' 8 The opinion stated that "it seems hardly to admit
of rational doubt' 19 that an express trust dedicated to a specific religious
belief would be upheld. Indeed, the court said the trust must remain
inviolate and that courts must even inquire into doctrine to the extent
necessary to insure that the original purpose of the trust is not perverted.
20
Jones stated that in the second class of cases dealing with property held by
congregational churches, the property was held, if not subject to an express
trust,2 1 subject to those well-known principles that govern other volun-
tary associations. The disposition was not to be determined on the basis of
whether a group could be found that adhered to the original doctrine,
13. Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow. 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813) (Scot.);
Attorney Gen. ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817),
discussed in Note, supra note 7, at 1145-49.
14. Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 297 (1967); see generally ZOLLMrANN, supra note 3, at
233-61; Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62
MicH. L. REv. 419 (1964); Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious
Issues, 20 OHro ST. L.J. 508 (1959); Note, supra note 7; Note, Judicial Interven-
tion in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE
L.J. 1113 (1965).
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
16. Id. at 725. This case was decided under principles of federal common
law, although it was later held to be expressive of constitutional principles as
well. 393 U.S. 440, 446-47.
17. Watson v. Avery, 3 Ky. Rep. (Bush) 635 (1868).
18. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23.
19. Id. at 723.
20. Id. at 723-24. A concurring opinion in a later Supreme Court case says
that "only express conditions that may be effected without consideration of doctrine
are civilly enforceable." Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 n.2 (1970) (emphasis added).
21. According to Jones all property, whether held by a hierarchical church
or a congregational one, which is subject to an express trust must be dealt with
strictly under the terms of the trust. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 723.
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but instead the decision of the majority of the congregation would be bind-
ing on the court.
In the third class of cases, Jones held that the decision of the highest
church tribunal as to the disposition of property not subject to an express
trust should be binding on the courts. The Court reasoned that this would
uphold the integrity of religious associations; further, judges could avoid
deciding doctrinal disputes, an area in which they are presumably not as
competent as ecclesiastical authorities. 22
The Jones Court determined that the property was within this third
category since the Presbyterian Church had a hierarchical polity and the
property involved was not subject to an express trust. Accordingly, the court
found for the loyal group as designated by the general assembly. Although
much of the majority opinion was dictum, its logic has had a continuing
influence on the courts.23
Gonzalez v. Archbishop,24 a 1929 Supreme Court decision, basically
reaffirmed Jones, but indicated that the courts would not acquiesce in a
dear abuse of ecclesiastical authority. Gonzales asserted the right to a
chaplaincy in the Roman Catholic Church under a provision in a will. The
Archbishop of Manila refused to appoint him because he did not satisfy
Canon Law qualifications. The Supreme Court affirmed a decision dis-
missing the complaint, stating that the decision of a church tribunal on
purely ecclesiastical matters is binding on the civil judiciary, but only
"[i]n the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. '2 -
B. The Presbyterian Church Case
In the Presbyterian Church Case26 two congregations in Savannah,
Georgia, voted to withdraw from the Presbyterian Church in the United
States, an organization the Supreme Court characterized as a "hierarchical
general church organization."2 7 The local churches claimed that the gen-
22. Id. at 726-35. Regarding churches with a hierarchical polity the Court
stated:
All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent
to this government, and are bound to submit to it. ... It is of the essence
of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the
decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should
be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such
appeals as the organism itself provides for.
Id. at 729. Elsewhere, the Court said:
Here is no case of property devoted forever by... any specific declaration
of its owner, to the support of special religious dogmas . . . and so long
as any existing religious congregation can be ascertained to be that con-
gregation, or its regular and legitimate successor, it is entitled to the
use of the property.
Id. at 726.
23. See pt. IV, § B of this comment.
24. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
25. Id. at 16.
26. For commentary on the Presbyterian Church Case see Casad, Church
Property Litigation: A Comment on the Hull Church Case, 27 WAsH. & Lrn L.
Rnv. 44 (1970); Kauper, supra. note 5: Comment, Constitutional Law-Church
Property Disputes-First Amendment Prohibits Judicial Examination of Ecclesiasti-
cal Matters, 54 I& L. R.v. 899 (1969).
27. 393 U.S. at 441.
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eral church had departed, in several respects, from the doctrine held at the
time they had affiliated. The alleged departures included appointment of
women as both ministers and ruling elders, support of the removal of
prayer from public schools, pronouncements on the Vietnam War, and dis-
semination of publications denying the Holy Trinity.28 An administra-
tive tribunal, appointed by the general church through the Presbytery of
Savannah, took over the local church property because a compromise could
not be reached. Instead of appealing to higher church tribunals, the local
churches sued in the Georgia state courts to enjoin the general church from
trespassing on the disputed property. The general church filed a motion
to dismiss and cross-claimed for an injunction, contending the civil courts
were without power to adjudicate whether the general church had departed
from original tenets of faith and practice.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The case was submitted
to a jury on the theory that Georgia law implies a trust in favor of the
church on the condition that it adhere to the doctrine in existence at
the time the local churches affiliated. The jury was instructed to find for
the local churches if the general church had substantially abandoned its
original doctrine. The jury found for the local churches. The Georgia Su-
preme Court affirmed2 9 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court held that Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral30 had the effect
of converting "the principle of Jones as qualified by Gonzalez into a con-
stitutional rule."31 The Presbyterian Church Case stressed that analysis
and determination of doctrinal issues by civil courts plainly jeopardized
first amendment values. The Court expressed concern that such adjudica-
tions inhibit the free development of religion and constitute an invasion by
secular interests into religious matters."32 The Court emphasized that the
departure-from-doctrine standard "can play no rule in any future judicial
proceeding."3 3
The Court was vague as to the scope of review after the Presbyterian
Church Case, although it made two major points. First, the opinion stated
that courts do not violate the free exercise of religion clause by merely
hearing church property disputes. In conjunction with this the Court re-
ferred to "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property dis-
putes, which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which prop-
erty is awarded."3 4 Second, the Court reaffirmed Gonzalez and approved
28, Id. at 442 n. 1.
29. 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
30. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). Kedroff held that a statute transferring control of
a cathedral from its original Moscow-based hierarchy to the Russian Orthodox
Church in America violated the free exercise of religion dause.
31. 393 U.S. at 447. Kedroff was later extended by Kreshik v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam) to cover judicial action as well.
Kreshik reversed, on first amendment grounds, a decision of the New York courts
that purported to transfer the same cathedral involved in Kedroff to the inde-
pendant American church.
32. 393 U.S. at 449.
3 3, Id. at 450.
34. Id. at 449.
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the review of ecclesiastical decisions to determine if they were free from
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. 85
On remand the general church lost the property anyway. The Georgia
Supreme Court held that because the departure-from-doctrine theory was
invalid, the implied trust theory in favor of the general church was also.
The local churches were deemed the owners of the property because legal
title was in their name.8 6
IV. CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES IN MISSOURI
A. In General
A frequently stated rule in Missouri decisions is that courts have no
jurisdiction over matters involving religious beliefs.3 7 An exception to this
rule has been recognized when the litigation involves property rights.38 Be-
cause the rules involving property and nonproperty disputes have sometimes
overlapped, a brief explanation of the treatment of nonproperty disputes
involving religious organizations is appropriate.
In general, a court will not exercise jurisdiction to hear the appeal
of a deposed minister or excommunicated church member, but will require
the aggrieved party to look to church judicatories for relief.3 9 Such a judi-
catory might be the highest church tribunal or, if the church is congrega-
tional, its judicatory could be the majority of the congregation. Dismissal of
a cause of action for libel where the defendants claimed to be acting in an
official ecclesiastical capacity,40 and dismissal of a case in which the plain-
tiff sought a mandatory injunction to compel a Jewish court of justice to
render a decision,4 1 have both been held to be beyond the scope of judicial
review. One rationale for this policy of judicial abstention is that when a
person joins a religious organization he does so on condition that he will
submit to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction.42 Missouri courts have qualified this
rule of judicial laissez-faire in that that they require that a properly consti-
tuted tribunal rendered the decision in accordance with the practice, rules,
and customs of the church. 43
35. Id. at 451. The Court said that reviewing for fraud or arbitrariness would
not inject the dvil courts into "substantial ecclesiastical matters." Id. The Court
ultimately rejected the departure-from-doctrine standard because it was a creation
of state law, as opposed to church law. The Court said that even if a church were
to apply the departure-from-doctrine standard itself, this would not be reviewable
by a state court. Id.
36. 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
37. See, e.g., Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353, 378 (1873); Stone v. Bogue, 238
Mo. App. 392, 398, 181 S.W.2d 187, 189 (K.C. Ct. App. 1944).
38. Cases cited note 37 supra.
39. Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 644, 121 S.W. 805, 810 (En Banc 1909);
Longmeyer v. Payne, 205 S.W.2d 263, 266 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947).
40. Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433 (1883).
41. Schwartz v. Jacobs, 352 S.W.2d 389 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
42. Id. at 392.
43. Prickett v. Wells, 117 Mo. 502, 24 S.W. 52 (1893). In Briscoe v. Williams,
192 S.W.2d 643 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946), the court dissolved an injunction restrain.
ing defendant from acting as pastor of a Corinthian Missionary Baptist Church
because of procedural irregularities in his removal, including the failure of the
parties to exhaust the remedies the church provided.
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss4/5
ROLE OF COURTS IN CHURCH PROPERTY
Missouri courts have been willing to intervene when property rights
are involved. Many cases apply the now unconstitutional departure-from-
doctrine element of the implied trust rule.44
The implied trust theory is a legal fiction, premised on the court's
duty to uphold the intent of the donor who contributes money or property
for a charitable purpose. The court in McRoberts v. Moudy45 stated:
A charity given for a particular purpose cannot be altered or
diverted to any other. It must be accepted and retained upon the
same terms upon which it was given, and no concurrence among
the donees can operate to transfer or apply it to other purposes.46
When church property is acquired as the result of small contributions by
many donors the rule is predicated upon a common group intent.47
Application of the implied trust theory results in dead-hand control
of property based on an assumed intent unless, of course, an express trust
is involved. Even if the donor intends that original doctrine be adhered
to, a strong argument can be made that he would have preferred that
learned theologians decide doctrinal issues instead of the civil judi-
dary.48
Church property is generally held by trustees for the church's use.
If the church is incorporated, the corporation has the power to act as
trustee and the congregation is the cestui que truSt.49
The following discussion examines the treatment in Missouri of prop-
erty disputes involving hierarchical and congregational churches.
B. Hierarchical Churches
Watson v. Jones,5° explicitly relied on language in the Missouri de-
cision of State ex rel. Watson v. Farris51 to support the proposition that, as
to churches with a hierarchical polity, decrees of ecclesiastical tribunals
should be binding. Farris was a quo warranto action involving a dispute
over who could act as trustee of Lindenwood College. The corporate char-
ter provided that vacancies were to be filled by the Presbytery of St. Louis,
but a schism had developed and two separate Presbyteries claimed to be the
legitimate church. The general assembly of the Presbyterian Church dis-
solved the defendants's Presbytery after the defendants issued a resolution
condemning a declaration of the general church. The court ruled that the
44. See, e.g., Lewis v. Wolfe, 413 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967); Mertz v.
Schaeffer, 271 S.W.2d 238 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
45. 19 Mo. App. 26 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
46. Id. at 82.
47. See ZOLLmANN, supra note 3, at 228-29.
48. See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 H4atv.
L. R v. 993, 1024 (1930).
49. See Sandusky v. Sandusky, 261 Mo. 351, 168 S.W. 1150 (1914). When
suits regarding the proper disposition of church property are brought under the
theory of spoilation of trust assets, as is often the case, the proper remedy is in-junctive relief. See, e.g. Fulbright v. Higginbotham, 133 Mo. 668, 34 S.W. 875(1896); Clevenger v. McAfee, 237 Mo. App. 1077, 170 S.W.2d 424 (K.C. Ct. App.
1943).
50. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 732 (1871).
51. 45 Mo. 183 (1869).
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action of the general assembly in dissolving the Presbytery was conclusive
and thus defendants had no power to act as trustees. 52
Farris recognized the broad powers of ecclesiasticial tribunals and ac-
knowledged compelling policy considerations militating against review of
ecclesiastical decisions. The court stated:
It would involve them [the courts] in difficulties and contentions,
and impose upon them duties which are not in harmony with
their proper functions. Before a court could give an enlightenedjudgment it would necessarily have to explore the whole range of
the doctrine and discipline of the given church, and survey the
vast field of the Divine Word.53
Although Farris did not involve a property dispute, and although it
contained dictum to the effect that the result would have been different if
it had,54 one might have expected the Supreme Court's interpretation of it
in Jones to have been very persuasive when litigation next appeared in
Missouri. As it turned out, a year after Jones was decided it was harshly
criticized by the Missouri Supreme Court in Watson v. Garvin.5 5
The controversy in Garvin was an extension of the Presbyterian dispute
in Farris. This time plaintiffs, a group faithful to the Presbyterian gen-
eral assembly, sought control of church property in the possession of de-
fendants. In ruling for the defendants the court indicated that it was not
necessary to decide whether there was an implied trust in favor of the gen-
eral church or a departure-from-doctrine. Instead, the decision rests on the
premise that the general assembly had violated its own rules of procedure
by dissolving the presbytery without a trial.5 6
On rehearing the Missouri Supreme Court expressed unqualified dis-
approval of the principle that civil courts should abdicate jurisdiction in
favor of an ecclesiastical judicatory in matters involving property
rights. In addition, the Missouri court criticized the Supreme Court's de-
cision to accept jurisdiction in Jones after the Kentucky courts had already
determined the matter.5 7
Any remaining doubt whether the Missouri courts would apply the
departure-from-doctrine standard was resolved in Russie v. Brazzell,58 de-
cided by a unanimous Missouri Supreme Court in 1895. The case grew out
of the United Brethren controversy that was the subject of litigation in
many state courts around the turn of the century.59 A split in the Eagles-
ville Church of the United Brethren of Christ had developed over an
amendment to the church constitution. The object of the amendment, as
stated by the general conference of the church, was to provide a definitive
52. Id. at 198.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 54 Mo. 353 (1873).
56. See id. at 357.
57. Id. at 369-85.
58. 128 Mo. 93, 30 S.W. 526 (1895).
59. See e.g., Lamb v. Cain, 129 Ind. 517, 29 N.E. 13 (1891), where the court
held that this was an ecclesiastical matter and the court was bound by the adjudi-
cation of the church government. See ZOLLMANN, supra note 3, at 205-09, for a dis-
cussion of the history of this controversy.
[Vol. 38
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confession of faith and constitution for the church. According to the old
constitution no amendment could be adopted without a two-thirds vote
of the entire society.
The defendants, who refused to accept the new constitution, con-
tended: (1) That the amendment was invalid because it required ratifica-
tion by two-thirds of all members, not merely two-thirds of those voting;
and (2) that the revised confession was a departure from the fundamental
doctrines of the church and thus constituted misuse of the implied trust
under which the property was held. The Missouri court overruled the de-
fendants's first contention of procedural irregularity, holding that ratifica-
tion merely required two-thirds of those voting. In reference to the alleged
departure from doctrine the court stated, "However embarrassing it may
be, it becomes our duty to determine the question." 60 The court proceeded
to compare the new and old confessions following the example of a Penn-
sylvania court that had previously considered the issue. 61 The court de-
termined that the church's distinctive principles of both polity and creed
had been retained. Because no departure from doctrine was found the
property was awarded to the plaintiffs.
The Missouri Supreme Court conducted an extensive inquiry into
religious doctrine in Boyles v. Roberts,62 decided the same year the St.
Louis Court of Appeals indicated it would defer to the decisions of church
authorities.6 3 In Boyles a schism in the Cumberland Presbyterian Church at
Warrensburg had arisen as a result of the merger of the Cumberland Presby-
terian Church with the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Plaintiffs
sued to enjoin those who repudiated the merger from using the property.
The court summarily rejected the contention that it should defer to
the adjudications of ecclesiastical courts. It indicated that to do so would
be "a flagrant violation of constitutional mandates," 64 reasoning that ec-
clesiastical authorities do not have jurisdiction to determine matters in-
volving title to property.
The court compared the confessions of faith of the two churches in
detail and ruled that the merger had effectuated a departure from the
original tenets and faith of the Cumberland church. Through the at-
tempted merger the Cumberland church had forsaken its separate identity
in order to become part of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.
This, the court declared, violated the Cumberland church constitution,
which required it to form a union with another religious society only by
taking the other under its own jurisdiction.65 Thus, the court not only de-
termined doctrinal questions, but also imposed an interpretation of the
Cumberland church constitution contrary to the ecclesiastical tribunal's in-
terpretation. Two dissents stressed the wholesomeness of church merger and
concluded that the court was obstructing the road to church unity."66
60. 128 Mo. at 113, 30 S.W. at 532.
61. Schlichter v. Keiter, 156 Pa. 119, 27 A. 45 (1893).
62. 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (En Banc 1909).
63. Klix v. Polish Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Parish, 137 Mo. App. 347,
118 S.W. 1171 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
64. 222 Mo. at 647, 121 S.W. at 811.
65. Id. at 681, 121 S.W. at 823.
66. See id. at 696-786, 121 S.W. at 828-58 (dissenting opinions).
1973]
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A motion to rehear Boyles was overruled, but Chief Judge Valliant cast
serious doubt on the validity of the rationale:
[I]n a case involving title to property, if a question arises as to the
meaning of certain clauses in the confession of faith of a particu-
lar church, and if the parties litigant are all members of the same
church, and if the highest ecclesiastical court of that church has put
on the disputed clauses a certain interpretation, this court would
adopt that interpretation as conclusive; but, if the parties litigant
on one side were not members of the church, we would have to
take the written confession of faith and interpret it as we would
any other written instrument.67
Hayes v. Manning,68 decided only five years later on practically identi-
cal facts, confirmed this abrupt change in the court's reasoning. Hayes
involved the congregation of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church at Mar-
shall. The antimerger group had obtained an injunction from the lower
court against the pro-merger members using the property. The supreme
court reversed, holding that the decisions of the highest church tribunals
on ecclesiastical questions were conclusive. The court reasoned that ecclesi-
astical authorities were in the best position to interpret their organic law
and that church members should be bound by their adjudications. In de-
claring this doctrine of judicial noninterference, the Hayes court specifically
relied on the reasoning in Jones, Farris, and Judge Valliant's language on
rehearing in Boyles.69 Also persuasive was the previous repudiation of
Boyles by the Federal District Court for Western Missouri.7 0
Although Boyles has not been explicitly overruled, Hayes clearly
spelled the demise of the departure-from-doctrine standard in Missouri,
at least as applied to churches with a hierarchical polity. Since Hayes, it
has been accepted that in property disputes involving hierarchical churches
the courts would defer to the judgment of a properly constituted church
tribunal on ecclesiastical questions71
Even so, the court must determine what bodies can properly be con-
sidered "authoritative church tribunals." One Missouri court indicated
that if there is no clear statement in a constitution or by-laws, it would look
to custom and practice to discern where governing authority is vested -2
Thus, when two competing hierarchies asserted control of property this
court ruled that the group that met in the authorized manner and place in
conformity with church law was entitled to the property.'r
Incorporation of a religious organization does not change its polity.74
67. Id. at 696, 121 S.W. at 828 (emphasis added).
68. 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897 (En Banc 1914).
69. See text accompanying note 67 supra; 263 Mo. at 38-42, 172 S.W. at 902-05.
70. Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319 (W.D. Mo. 1913), a!f'd sub. nom. Shephard
v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1917).
71. Mars v. Galbraith, 288 Mo. App. 497, 184 S.W.2d 190 (K.C. Ct. App.
1944); Stone v. Bogue, 288 Mo. App. 392, 181 S.W.2d 187 (K.C. Ct. App. 1944);
Olear v. Haniak, 235 Mo. App. 249, 181 S.W.2d 375 (St. L. Ct. App. 1989).
72. Stone v. Bogue, 288 Mo. App. 892, 181 S.W.2d 187 (K.C. Ct. App. 1944).
78. Id.
74. Klix v. Polish Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Parish, 187 Mo. App. 347,
118 S.W. 1171 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909). The laws governing incorporation of re-
ligious and charitable associations are contained in §§ 352.010-.240, RSMo 1969.
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Also, Missouri courts have indicated that complainants must exhaust their
ecclesiastical remedies before a case involving a hierarchical church can be
considered.7 5
C. Congregational Churches
Even though Missouri courts had ceased using the departure-from-doc-
trine test in cases involving hierarchical churches, they continued to apply
it when congregational churches were involved.7 6 Only one case, Clevenger
v. McAfee,' 7 has held that the majority of the membership has the right
to determine use of church property.
Clevenger involved a controversy in the New Garden Baptist Church
in Ray County precipitated by the election, by plaintiff's faction, of a trus-
tee to replace defendant McAfee. Defendant's faction forcibly entered the
church and attempted to appropriate it to themselves. Plaintiffs obtained
an injunction against this appropriation on the theory that in a voluntary
association not subject to the rule of a higher authority the majority may,
in a properly authorized meeting, remove an officer at any time.78 Although
the facts do not disclose if there was an underlying doctrinal dispute,
arguably this is irrelevant because the court relied on the Supreme Court's
language in Jones precluding judicial review of majority actions in a con-
gregational church.79 However, this principle has been rejected in other
decisions because of the fear that a temporary majority could come in and
divert the property to the use of another faith.8 0
Missouri's version of the departure-from-doctrine standard imposes a
strict test. In Mertz v. Schaeffer s l the court stated:
[T]he majority must evidence a real and definite departure from
the basic faith of the church before the minority can successfully
maintain that the majority has departed from its doctrine.8 2
Relying on this language, a subsequent decision held that when a Freewill
Baptist Church switched its affiliation from the Union Association to the
National Association there was no departure from doctrine.8 3 Similarly, in
See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75
HAzv. L. Rxv. 1142, 1179-80 (1962), for a general discussion of the effect of state
incorporation laws on church polity.
75. 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S.W. 1171; Olear v. Haniak, 235 MoApp. 249,
131 S.W.2d 375 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939).
76. Clemmons v. Smith, 379 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1964); Fulbright v. Higgin-
1hotham, 133 Mo. 668, 34 S.W. 875 (1896); Lewis v. Wolfe, 413 S.W.2d 314 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1967); Mills v. Yount, 393 S.W.2d 96 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965); Montgomery
v. Snyder, 320 S.W.2d 288 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958); Mertz v. Schaeffer, 271 S.W.2d
238 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954); Trett v. Lambeth, 195 S.W.2d 524 (Spr. Mo. App.
1946).
77. 237 Mo. App. 1077, 170 S.W.2d 424 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943).
78. Id. at 1085-86, 170 S.W.2d at 428.
79. Id. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
80. Mills v. Yount, 393 S.W.2d 96 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965). The court stated:
"[T]he right to religious freedom is not the right to steal churches." Id. at 101.
81. 271 S.W.2d 238 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
82. Id. at 241. The court compared the Common Confession of the Missouri
Synod with Orthodox Lutheran doctrine and concluded that no departure had
occurred.
83. Montgomery v. Snyder, 320 S.W.2d 283 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
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a dispute involving members of a Pentecostal Tabernacle in Springfield
who voted to affiliate with the Church of God, the court ruled there was
no departure from doctrine even though a change in denomination was
effected.8 4 Although several congregational church cases involve allegations
of a departure from doctrine, not once has a Missouri court found that the
majority did in fact depart from doctrine.
D. Procedural Inquiry
In general, Missouri courts have not hesitated to inquire into alleged
procedural defects. The scope of allowable inquiry becomes particularly
important in light of the Presbyterian Church Case. In terms of organiza-
tional procedure, apart from the departure-from-doctrine standard, the
Missouri courts have applied the same rules to churches as they would to
other voluntary associations.8 5 For instance, it has been determined that
a member's right to vote may be lost by voluntary withdrawal.80
Courts will insure that there was a meeting properly called and prop-
erly conducted at which the congregational action8 7 in controversy was
taken.8 8 An example of the application of this rule is Trett v. Lambeth,80
where plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction to compel defendants to
remove a lock placed on the church door that prevented them from using
the church. The leader of defendant faction had called a church meeting
without notifying most of the congregation. At the meeting he conducted
an election in which only five of the 25 or more present voted to withdraw
from the Southern Missionary Baptist Convention. No vote was allowed to
see how many persons wished to remain within the convention. Those dis-
agreeing with the vote were expelled without notification, contrary to
church procedure. The court held the election was illegal and granted
plaintiffs relief.
This case would fall within the Gonzalez doctrine of fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness. It is not difficult, however, to imagine a case in which the
rules of church procedure are not dear, and thus the court would have
to resolve doctrinal issues, which is forbidden under the Presbyterian
Church Case.90
E. Summary
Since Hayes, application of the departure-from-doctrine standard by
Missouri courts had been confined to disputes involving congregational
churches. It now violates the first amendment, according to the Presby-
84. Lewis v. Wolfe, 418 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967); contra, Black v.
Tackett, 287 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. App. 1951), holding an attempt to switch from the
Pentecostal faith to the Church of God was a departure from doctrine.
85. See Fulbright v. Higginbotham, 133 Mo. 668, 34 S.W. 875 (1896);
Clevenger v. McAfee, 237 Mo. App. 1077, 170 S.W.2d 424 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943).
86. Lewis v. Wolfe, 413 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
87. An example of inquiry into hierarchical procedures is contained in Rus-
sie v. Brazzell, 128 Mo. 93, 30 S.W. 526 (1895). See text following note 59 supra.
88. E.g., Montgomery v. Snyder, 820 S.W.2d 288 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). See
cases cited note 43 supra.
89. 195 S.W.2d 524 (Spr. Mo. App. 1946).
90. See Mitchell v. Albanian Orthodox Diocese in America, Inc., 355 Mass.
278, 244 N.E.2d 276 (1969), involving a conflict over whether a bishop was to be
elected by church by-laws or by canon law.
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terian Church Case.91 The assumption is that the courts will treat congre-
gational churches as they do other voluntary associations. This will gen-
erally result in a majority of the congregation controlling the use of property
unless church rules provide for another procedure. 92
No Missouri cases involving church property disputes in hierarchical
churches have been decided since the Presbyterian Church Case. It is prob-
able, though of course not certain, that Missouri courts will continue to
defer to decisions of ecclesiastical courts in these controversies. Such an ap-
proach would be consistent with the Presbyterian Church Case and case law
prior thereto. 93 A few courts in other jurisdictions have adopted the posi-
tion that instead of deferring blindly to decisions of ecclesiastical courts,
they will award property to whoever holds legal tide.94
If Missouri adheres to its traditional view of hierarchical churches,
then unresolved constitutional question of how much inquiry is permissible
in order to identify the church's governing authority could arise. In the
Presbyterian Church Case the Court was adamant that civil courts have
"no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving
property disputes." 95 When the polity of a church is unclear,96 or when
it is dearly hierarchical but competing hierarchies claim to be the true
governing authority,97 a court may encroach on ecclesiastical questions if
it probes too deeply into the structure of a church. Part five of this com-
ment will focus on these issues.
V. INTERPRETING THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH CASE MANDATE
In the Presbyterian Church Case the Court admonished states, religious
societies, and individuals to structure their relationships involving church
property so as to make civil judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical questions
unnecessary.9 8 This is exactly what the Presbyterian Church in the United
States had tried, but failed,99 to do through its basic constitutional docu-
ment.1 0 0
Two basic questions will be examined in the following discussion.
First, is it constitutionally permissible for a court to defer to the judgment
91. Although the language in the Presbyterian Church Case is certainly broad
enough to include congregational churches within its holding, the case dealt with
a hierarchical church, 393 U.S. 440, 441, as did Jones, Gonzalez, Kreshik and
Kedroff, the cases relied on for the Presbyterian Church Case holding.
92. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872); Clevenger v. McAfee,
237 Mo. App. 1077, 170 S.W.2d 424 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943); Kauper, Church Au-
tonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 Sup. CT.
REv, 347.371-72.
93. See cases cited and text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
94. See cases cited note 121 infra.
95. 393 U.S. at 447.
96. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
97. See case cited and text accompanying note 72 supra.
98. 393 U.S. at 449.
99. 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 896 U.S. 1041 (1970).
100. THE Book OF CHURCH ORDER oF THE P rsnyTERAN CHURCH IN THE
UNrrFD STATES § 6-3 (1972 ed.), provides in substance that when a church is dis-
solved by the Presbytery, or otherwise ceases to exist, those holding title to the
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of an ecclesiastical tribunal when the deed to the disputed property con-
tains no reversion or express trust in favor of the general church? Sec-
ond, does judicial inquiry into church polity violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment? In attempting to answer these questions
reference will first be made to Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,1 1 a companion
case to the Presbyterian Church Case decision.
A. The Sharpsburg Case
In Sharpsburg, plaintiffs, the Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the
Churches of God, sought to prevent two local incorporated Churches of
God from withdrawing. Determination was also sought concerning which
of the two factions in each suit was entitled to church property. The
Churches of God have a hierarchical polity. Because of the broad powers
given to the local church trustees under the Maryland religious corporation
laws,102 and because the corporate charter conferred ownership on the
local churches, the Maryland appellate court held that the majority of each
congregation could determine use of the property and had the power to
withdraw. The court indicated that a church could have characteristics of
a hierarchical polity, yet have a congregational polity regarding use of its
property.103
Also, the Maryland appellate court asserted that there were only three
methods by which a hierarchical church could insure control over local
church property: (1) It can require reverter clauses in its favor in the deeds
to the property of the local churches; (2) it can provide in its constitution
or some other authoritative source for reversion of the local church prop-
erty to the hierarchical body upon withdrawal by a local congregation; or
(3) it can obtain from the General Assembly an act providing for such a
result.104
Since the Church of God at Sharpsburg had not utilized any of these
methods, the property went to the local churches. Referring to the third
means of control noted above the court pointed out that four denomina-
tions had obtained statutes from the Maryland legislature insuring their
right as hierarchical polities to control local church property.105 These
statutes are likely unconstitutional as a violation of the establishment clause
if judged according to Justice Black's famous dictum in Everson v. Board
of Education:0 6 "Neither can [a state nor the Federal Government] pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an
other." ' 0 7
The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the Maryland statute giving
control of the property to those holding legal title was a violation of the
101. 249 Md. 650, 241 A.2d 691 (1968), vacated & remanded, 393 U.S. 528
(1969), afl'd, 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), aff d per curiam, 396 U.S. 367
(1970).
102. MD. CoDE ANN., art. 23, §§ 256-70 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
103. 249 Md. at 664, 241 A.2d at 699.
104. Id. at 663, 241 A.2d at 699.
105. Id. at 674, 241 A.2d at 705.
106. 380 U.S. 1 (1947).
107. Id. at 15.
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free exercise and establishment clauses. The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded in light of the Presbyterian Church Case.'08 The Maryland court
affirmed, insisting it had decided the case under neutral principles of prop-
erty law as required by the Presbyterian Church Case.10 9 The Supreme
Court affirmed an appeal from this decision holding that because the
Maryland court did not inquire into religious doctrine in resolving the
dispute there was no substantial federal question." 0 The court avoided
deciding the constitutionality of the Maryland statute,':" which was being
challenged as "establishing" a congregational polity for all churches that
were not the subject of special legislation. 1 2
In 1966, an Alabama statute that permitted a 65 percent majority of
the congregation of a local church to withdraw from the parent church
and take its property with it was struck down by a federal court as a viola-
tion of the establishment clause." 3 This federal court, relying on Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral,"4 reasoned that the legislature had attempted to
change established systems of church ownership without regard to the ec-
clesiastical law and polity of each religious organization. This same issue
was involved in Sharpsburg, but the court refused to recognize it, and for
that reason the opinion is unsatisfactory.
In a concurring opinion to Sharpsburg"5 Justice Brennan, joined by
two other members of the Court, attempted to clarify the Presbyterian
Church Case and offer some guidance to the courts. He outlined three ap-
proaches a court could take in settling church property disputes. First, they
could adopt the early Federal common law approach of Jones." 6 In cases
involving hierarchical churches this would mean awarding the property
according to the instructions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal. An im-
portant qualification to this approach is that the appropriate church gov-
erning body must be identified "without the resolution of doctrinal ques-
tions and without extensive inquiry into religious polity.""17 This language
is important for two reasons. First, it indicates that it is constitutionally
permissible for courts to acknowledge the hierarchical authority of a church
and defer to it; and second, it suggests that some inquiry, as long as it is
not extensive, is allowable.
The second approach offered in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
was resolution according to the neutral principles of law referred to in the
Presbyterian Church Case."18 This involves examination of deeds, reverter
108. 393 U.S. 528 (1969).
109. 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969); accord, Smith v. Church of God, 326
F. Supp. 6 (D. Md. 1971).
110. 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
111. Id.
112. See Casad, Church Property Litigation: A Comment on the Hull Church
Case, 27 WAsK. & LEE L. REv. 44, 66-67 (1970).
113. Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966),
aqfd, 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967); accord, Sustar v. Williams, 263 So. 2d 537
(Miss. 1972).
114. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). See note 30 supra.
115. 396 U.S. at 368.
116. Note that this approach as first outlined in Jones was heartily endorsed
in the Presbyterian Church Case, 393 U.S. at 44548.
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clauses, and state incorporation laws. Justice Brennan pointed out that this
approach is limited insofar as
general principles of property law may not be relied upon if
their application requires civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues
.... [P]rovisions in deeds ... for the reversion of local church
property to the general church, if conditioned upon a finding of
departure from doctrine, could not be civilly enforced.11 9
The third suggested alternative Justice Brennan referred to was "spe-
cial statutes governing church property arrangements in a manner that
precludes state interference in doctrine."'120 The opinion gave no dear
indication of the permissible reach of such a statute, and it is notable that
the Maryland statute in dispute was not offered as an example.
Also noteworthy was the concurring opinion's reference to express
conditions qualifying a donor's gift of church property. Justice Harlan
had concurred in the Presbyterian Church Case on the understanding that
express conditions in a deed or will limiting a church's use of property
would still be enforceable.' 21 In Sharpsburg, however, Justice Brennan
stated that express conditions were unenforceable if they required the court
to consider doctrine.'2 2 It is impossible to know if a majority of the court
actually subscribes to this view.
An example of a condition that may be unenforceable is: "To the
members of X church so long as they maintain their present confession of
faith."'12 Attorneys should advise donors who wish to insert such clauses
that the courts may refuse to enforce this type of limitation because it re-
quires a determination of doctrinal issues. Arguably, the principle of Shelley
v. Kraemer124-that racially restrictive covenants are judically unenforcable
-would be applicable if discriminatory conditions were included in a gift of
property to a church.
119. Id. In a footnote Justice Brennan says:
Thus a state that normally resolves disputes over religious property by
applying general principles of property law would have to use a dif-
ferent method in cases involving such provisions, perhaps that defined
in [Jones]. By the same token, States following the [Jones] approach
would have to find another ground for decision, perhaps the application
of general property law, when identification of the relevant church govern-
ing body is impossible without immersion in doctrinal issues or extensive
inquiry into church polity.
Id. at 370 n.4.
120. Id. at 370.
121. 393 U.S. at 452. Justice Harlan said:
If for example, the donor expressly gives his church some money on the
condition that the church never ordain a woman as a minister ... or
never amend certain specified articles of the Confession of Faith, he is
entitled to his money back if the condition is not fulfilled.
.d. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-24 (1872).
122. 396 U.S. at 370.
123. But see 393 U.S. at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
124. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The scope of the holding in Shelley v. Kraemer is un-
clear. In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), the Supreme Court held there was
no state action where a trust was terminated and the res distributed to the set-
tor's heirs when the subject of the trust, a park, could no longer be operated on
a racially discriminatory basis.
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B. The Establishment Clause Limitation
Some state courts have followed the lead of the Georgia Supreme Court
in the Presbyterian Church Case'25 by holding that there is no implied
trust in favor of a general hierarchical church and that the general church
will not be awarded the property unless there is an express trust or other
provision in the deed to the local church.126 The rationale for the "formal
title" approach is that the role of the courts is limited by the Presbyterian
Church Case to application of neutral principles of property law.'2 7 It is
also reasoned that this narrow scope of review will prevent the court from
having to identify the polity of a given church, which, it is argued, would
violate the establishment clauses.128
Maryland has continued to adhere to the somewhat more flexible view
of the lower court Sharpsburg opinion, i.e., that a general church can retain
property by providing for a reversion upon the local church's withdrawal. 2 9
Recently, it awarded property to the Church of God because the minutes of
the church's general assembly provided that if a local church ceased to
exist, the local trustees would hold the land as trustees for the Church of
God generally.139
Other decisions have rejected the "formal title" approach, preferring
to rely on the notion that inquiry into church constitutions, books of church
order, by-laws, corporate charters and other documentary evidence, for the
limited purpose of determining whether a dissenting local church is subject
to the rule of a higher authority, does not require doctrinal consideration
in violation of the first amendment.' 3 ' Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
125. 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
126. See Lowe v. First Presbyterian Church, 9 Ill. App. 3d 415, 292 N.E.2d
211 (1972); Pilgrim Holiness Church v. First Pilgrim Holiness Church, 115 Ill.
App. 2d 448, 252 N.E.2d 1 (1969); Merryman v. Price, 259 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. App.
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971); but see Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d
69 (Ind. App. 1972); United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent
Methodist Church, 276 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. App. 1971). See Serbian Orthodox
Church Congregation of St. Demetrius v. Kelemen, 21 Ohio St. 2d 154, 256
N.E.2d 212 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
127. See Merryman v. Price, 259 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. App. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 852 (1971); Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. Demetrius v.
Kelemen, 21 Ohio St. 2d 154, 256 N.E.2d 212 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827
(1970).
128. See cases cited note 127 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
130. Polen v. Cox, 259 Md. 25, 267 A.2d 201 (1970).
131. See Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. App. 1972); United
Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent Methodist Church, 276
N.E.2d 916 (Ind. App. 1971); Macedono-Bulgarian Orthodox Church "Saint
Clement Ohridski" v. Macedonian Patriotic Organization "Fatherland', 27 Mich.
App. 713, 184 N.W.2d 233 (1970); Wyche v. Alexander, 15 N.C. App. 130, 189
S.E.2d 608 (1972); St. Michael 8c Archangel Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic
Church v. Uhniat, 436 Pa. 222, 259 A.2d 862 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823
(1970); Pilgrim Holiness Church v. Pilgrim Holiness Church 436 Pa. 239, 259 A.2d
870 (1969); Presbytery, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 485 P.2d 615 (1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 996 (1972).
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in Sharpsburg has been cited as supporting this approach in decisions where
an implied trust -was found in favor of hierarchical churches.182
In other cases state courts have interpreted the Presbyterian Church
Case as expressly approving the approach in Jones.183 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has stated:
The Presbyterian Church decision thus fosters denominational
continuity and doctrinal evolution by making the decision of the
church tribunal the last word in the settlement of a church dispute
arising in a hierarchical church organization. 184
This language indicates the court's concern with upholding the integrity
of the hierarchical organization.
Even courts willing to defer to the decisions of the general church
face a substantial problem when one side contends the nature of church
government is congregational and the other side alleges it is hierarchical.
In his concurring opinion in Sharpsburg Justice Brennan stated:
[W]here the identify of the governing body or bodies within a
church is a matter of substantial controversy, civil courts are not
to make inquiry into religious law and usage which would be es-
sential to the resolution of the controversy.185
The apparent rationale for this is the notion that if a court undertakes to
determine the disputed polity of a church it will "establish" a church by
conferring a polity on it. Some decisions would arguably fall within the
purview of this prohibition. For instance, in one case it was determined
that the nature of a Baptist church was congregational, partially based on
evidence of church polity given by a professor of church history.1 88 In
St. John Chrysostom Greek Catholic Church v. Elko,' 87 members of de-
fendant local church claimed it was congregational while plaintiffs argued,
that it was hierarchical. Because there was no documentary evidence that
conclusively established the church as one or the other, the court referred
to what is called the "living relationship test."'18 8 The court reasoned that
the church had a hierarchical polity based on certain actions of the local
church. Among these was that all the priests mentioned the Pope in Mass
and they always sought redress for grievances through the hierarchical chan-
nels of the Uniate church (Uniate Greek Catholic Churches were those
182. Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. App. 1972); United Methodist
Church v. St. Louis Crossing Methodist Independent Church, 276 N.E.2d 916
(Ind. App. 1971).
133. St. Michael & Archangel Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v.
Uhniat, 436 Pa. 222, 259 A.2d 862 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1970); Pres-
bytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 485 P.2d 615 (1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 996 (1972).
134. St. Michael & Archangel Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v.
Uhniat, 436 Pa. 222, 236, 259 A.2d 862, 868 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970.)
185. 896 U.S. at 869.
186. Nolynn Ass'n of Separate Baptists in Christ v. Oak Grove Separate
Baptist Church, 457 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
137. 486 Pa. 243, 259 A.2d 419 (1969), cert. denied, Dober v. Elko, 0 U..
920 (1970).
188. See Note, judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church
Property, 75 Hiv. L. R.v. 1142, 1162 (1962).
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under the jurisdiction of Rome). The court stated that the Presbyterian
Church Case mandate was not violated because the court had not consid-
ered the significance and relevance of church doctrine. 3 9
Similarly, a New York court was recently asked to ascertain which of
two competing hierarchies was entitled to the control of church property.1 40
The court held that the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of Amer-
ica instead of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church in Exile was the
governing authority in regard to the disputed property. Both in this case
and the Elko case dissents argued that the courts were violating the first
amendment by establishing a polity for the churches.14 1
VI. CONCLUSION
It is safe to say that in churches with a congregational polity 42 the
local congregation may determine the use of its property. However, the
cases split on how to resolve property disputes involving hierarchical
churches. There are two approaches available: the "formal title" approach
involving examination of title documents to determine whether title is held
by the local church or by the general church, either directly or through a
reversion;' 43 and the Jones method, by which a court defers to the highest
governing authority of a church, accepting its determination of owner-
ship.144
The "formal title" approach does not violate the constitution by inter-
fering with free exercise or establishment of religion because in utilizing
it a court does not need to consider doctrine.145 Another advantage of the
approach is that it encourages religious societies to title their property
clearly.14 6
The Jones approach is also permissible under the first amendment un-
less church polity is disputed. A court does not resolve doctrine or "estab-
lish" a church by acknowledging a clearly established church hiararchy. In
139. 436 Pa. at 256, 259 A.2d at 425.
140. Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan v. Dunkel, 67 Misc. 2d 1032, 326
N.Y.S.2d 727 (1971), aff'd, 41 App. Div. 2d 746, 341 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1973).
141. 436 Pa. at 256, 259 A.2d at 425 (dissenting opinion); 41 App. Div. 2d
at 747, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (dissenting opinion).
142. Presumably Justice Brennan states the law in this respect when he says:
States may . .. enforce the property decisions made wthin a church
of congregational polity "by a majority of its members or by such other
local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical
government.
Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc., 396
U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (concurring opinion).
143. Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God,
Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam); Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of
St. Demetrius v. Kelemen, 21 Ohio St. 2d 154, 256 N.E.2d 212 (1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 827 (1970).
144. E.g., Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897 (En Banc 1914); Mar
v. Galbraith, 238 Mo. App. 497, 184 S.W.2d 190 (K.C. Ct. App. 1944).
145. If express conditions require a court to consider doctrine it may be con-
stitutionally impermissible for a court to enforce them. See text accompanying
notes 121-123 supra.
146. Merryman v. Price, 147 Ind. App. 295, 259 N.E.2d 883, 893, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 852 (1971).
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addition, there was no hint in the Presbyterian Church Case that the Su-
preme Court was overruling the implied trust aspect of Jones. Proponents
of the Jones approach argue that it protects the hierarchical religious sys-
tem' 47 and that the "formal title" approach destroys the hierarchical
entity.148 The rationale behind this policy of protection is inconsistent.
The separation of church and state principle should prevent government
support of religious organizations as strongly as repression of them.
It is submitted that the strongest policy argument in favor of deferring
to authoritative religious bodies is based on equitable considerations. First,
in the majority of jurisdictions, at least prior to the Presbyterian Church
Case, general churches relied on the implied trust doctrine. It would be
impractical, if not impossible, for these churches to retitle this property.
Second, in hierarchical churches the initial organization and financing of
a local church is usually undertaken by a superior church body. Even if a
church is built completely out of local funds, it nonetheless receives sub-
stantial benefits from participation in the parent body.' 40 Indeed, the very
name of a church is valuable in attracting members. The argument can be
advanced in favor of the implied trust doctrine that the general church
has obtained equitable property rights in the local church. Third, the
application of the "formal title" doctrine arguably results in a taking of
its property without due process of law in violation of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.
Finally, the one obvious lesson that emerges is that religious societies
should define their structure and property relationships dearly in deeds
and church documents if they wish to insure organizational integrity.
KIMBERLY HUGHES
147. St. Michael & Archangel Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v.
Uhniat, 436 Pa. 222, 237, 259 A.2d 862, 869 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823
(1970).
148. See Comment, supra note 26, at 914.
149. See United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent
Methodist Church, 276 N.E.2d 916, 925 (Ind. App. 1971).
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